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The "Science" of Social Policy: Max Weber Revisited
I
Asoke Basu
California State University, Hayward
Introduction
Science documents two sources of knowledge--sense and
reason. Further, according to Kant, "The nature of the outer
empirical world is not known, what becomes known is that which is
perceived." Human constructs represent outer reality. They do
not express reality directly as it is in original nature. The aim
of the social scientist can never be to eliminate the relative per-
spective of social reality. It is to understand and explain it
within a larger cultural framework. The nature of this task brings
the social scientist "close" to defining the social reality within
a broader cultural praxis. Any policy--essentially, a set of judg-
ments and hence, conclusions, must always be tempered with this
thought in mind.
Scientific values imply causation. Here, the conment on
Heisenberg phenomenon--namely that the process of study and obser-
vation in the physical science modifies the data, equally applies
to the science of social policy formulations. Study and observa-
tion which utilize a set of definitions which assume certain value-
positions, clearly have an effect (dependent variable) on the nature
of conclusions to be reported. Here we are arguing that the values
that do define social "problems" have been seldom discussed.
Hunger, for example, can either be an evidence of functional motiva-
tion extant on the economic market place which encourages a populace
to participate in the societal mainstream or it could be an evidence
of a social malaise relating to an economic injustice in the social
structure. Deeply anchored in such prognostications is the view of
causation. Further, social scientists attempt to explain causal
statements, insofar as the conceptual phenomena are interrelated.
Concepts form a link between the observer, the observed, and the
object (purpose) of the observation.
Any policy organizes our empirical observations (data) which
in turn, explains our cultural reality. Causal conceptual clarifi-
cations, as formal explanations, are the primal task of the science
of social policy. These concepts tell us just what it is that we
IAn earlier version of this paper was read at The Council
of Social Work Education, Phoenix, 1977. Steven Burnett provided
research assistance.
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seek to formulate. As implied earlier, any politia--the science
of government, involves perceptions of cultural reality as the
policy planner perceives. What we are actually dealing with then,
are abstractions from our perceptions of reality. On the surface
this would appear to be a very shaky foundation upon which to base
concrete conclusions. However, this must be so. We must establish
some finite restrictions--call them boundaries, parameters, etc.,
to get a grip on the conceptual underpinnings of the observed
events, and the policy outcomes. These finite boundaries are arti-
ficial for the simple reason that they have been created by us and
are not found in nature.
The implications of the above statement for the science of
policy formulations are chiefly two-fold. First, social policy by
definition involves value judgments. As a general rule, the sooner
the investigator articulates his or her position, the sooner the
second stage could be instigated--viz., once the perception of the
social scientists' abstracted (from observed events) social reality
has been put forth, one can underline (and thus examine) formal
causal propositions. A failure to articulate this task results in
the fundamental scientific inconsistency of means and ends. Here
the extended remark by Max Weber is quite ' propos:
It (consistency) can, in so far as it sets itself this goal,
aid the acting willing person in attaining self-clarification
concerning the final axioms from which his desired ends are
derived. It can assist him in becoming aware of the ultimate
standards of value which he does not make explicit to himself
or which he must presuppose in order to be logical. The
elevation of these ultimate standards, which are manifested
in concrete value-judgments, to the level of explicitness is
the utmost that the scientific treatment of value judgments
can do without entering into the realm of speculation. As to
whether the person expressing these value-judgments should
adhere to these ultimate standards is his personal affair; it
involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge.
An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do--
but rather what he can do--and under certain circumstances--
what he wishes to do. (Weber, 1949:54; italics in the
original).
In the formulation of the science of social policy, the
design is the slave and not the master. The fundamental confusion,
or the interlocation of means and ends, rests with this view.
Designs which allow the policy-planners to test his or her assump-
tions, cannot be efficiently and effectively developed without the
conceptual clarity. All too often experimental designs have
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prescribed the explanation of cultural events. More importantly,
the need for a particular "scientific" design has been arbitrated
by the planner's desire not to underline his or her value
dispositions. Resultantly, since individuals are involved in
events which one defines as "problems", the tendency by this group
has been to seek "answers" within the individuals involved. This
is a fruitless exercise. As we know, if the individual is elimin-
ated, social life would still continue. Therefore, the explanation
must be sought in the nature of society itself. It follows then
that the determination of the cause of "social" events must be
sought in the interactions preceding it, not within the conscious
state of the individual. Any scientific design which fails to
underline such a basic premise postulates a diagnostic dilemma.
Let us begin with an example from medicine. Under this
dilemma, the physician is faced with the problem of arriving at a
conclusion as to the cause of a condition based on too little data,
too soon, versus arriving at a more certain conclusion with enough
data, but too late to be of any use for the patient. Thus, we
propose conceptual positions ultimately decide the design, and
concomitantly, the nature of information (datum) to be obtained.
This failure establishes the distinction between the scientist and
therapist. To be a therapist is to seek solutions to specific
values as conditions and further, these conditions justify the end
to be desired. The scientist, to the contrary, views conditions as
means to entertain further assumptions of an outcome. Both are
applied. The critical difference in the view of the science of
social policy making is that the scientist-planner views the social
conditions as dynamic; whereas, therapist-solvers' weltanschauung
is static. The dynamic view articulates the sources of knowledge
which contribute to a systematic examination of a cause. It is
heuristic; while the other is reformistic.
The scientific view of social policy formulation cannot hope
to provide "locked" norms and ideals from which directives for
immediate day to day activities can be distilled. At best, this
formalistic view purports to examine in detail the value-assumptions
involved in the development of policy propositions. For ultimately,
the critical difference centers in the scientific conduct of means
and ends. Furthermore, this conduct is no different from the vast
majority of human conduct. Such an existential proximity has indeed
been differentiated in the aftermath of the "sputnik age". An
ethical-product (to speak in operational terms) of the scientific
process should act as an aid to the policy analyst in a type of
self-clarification concerning the "truth" about his or her desired
ends. Such an approach or declaration of policy assumptions is not
a semantic hyperbole. To be explicit is to be scientific. It is
only when the assumptions of intent (a formalistic approach) become
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particularistic, end-in-itself, that the diagnostic dilemma begins.
It becomes reformistic. The critical characteristic in such a
formulation assumes that one has already settled on the end. It is
exactly these values (ends) which must be the objects of our research.
For a proof to be scientifically and systematically valid (both
Internal and/or external) and reliable, it must be so regarded (not
necessarily approved) by all. Only then it is a fruitful effort.
Further, such formulations cannot be "true" only contex-
tually in one specific time-frame. The area of social policy con-
tains the possibilities for the greatest difficulty in this area.
It is slowly becoming historically-bound. There seems to be a grow-
ing trend of "solving" isolated "problems" dealing with this particu-
lar historical space-time only. The proponents of such "one-shot"
studies must be called into question not only with regard to the
discipline as a whole, but also to the problems that they purport
to solve.
The diachronic view is completely lost and with it any
historical-comparative analysis is forgotten. Unfortunately, in
America such an "isolationist impulse" has become as widespread and
damaging as it is unique. All too often, in the United States, the
public sector in the name of party partisanship has excerbated such
a diagnostic dilemma. For example, compare Graham Wallis' "great
society" with that of President Lyndon B. Johnson's reformistic
ideals. Empirical-cultural-reality is a political value, only be-
cause we place a partisan opinion on it. We only perceive what is
significant (valuable); all other historical premises are forgotten.
II
The Pedagogy of Policy Science - Max Weber
2
2Key English translations of Max Weber's works are: Max
Weber (1947), The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,
translated by A. R. Henderson and T. Parsons, The Free Press; Max
Weber (1947), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated,
edited and with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills,
Kegan Paul; Max Weber (1948), The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism, translated by T. Parsons, Allen and Unwin; Max Weber
(1949), The Methodology of Social Sciences, translated and edited
by E. A. Shils and H. N. Finch, The Free Press; Max Weber (1968),
Economy and Society, edited by Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich,
Bedminister Press. Writings on Max Weber are: Reinhard Bendix
(1962), Max Weber an Intellectual Portrait, Anchor Books; Raymond
Aron (1964), German Sociology, The Free Press; Julien Freund (1968),
The Sociology of Max Weber, Pantheon Books; Arun Sahay (1971), Max
Weber and Modern Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul; and J. E.7
Eldridge (1971), Max Weber: The Interpretation of Social Reality,
Charles Scribner's Sons.
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With this prolegomenon on the cultural-historical content
of the Science of Social Policy, I have set my next task to closely
examine the pedagogy of Max Weber. What follows then is almost a
textbook derivation on the implication of the science of social
policy as articulated by Max Weber in his various writings.
In the study of policy sciences, man is both the subject
and object of social inquiry. Policy science is ultimately "social"
knowledge, so it cannot be developed in the same vein as "stars and
molecules". For Weber, the framework of policy science is a value
concept. Culture forms the primae facie evidence. Our social
reality provides the empirical context of culture in terms of its
relevance or significance for us. Cultural sciences select certain
aspects of the world that present relevance for the observer (Weber,
1949:72).
Weber does not accept the idea of constructing a closed
system of concepts in which social policy is synthesized in an
universal classification. He surmises that we must abandon the
illusion of thinking that knowledge can provide the essence of the
'things', the laws of God and nature. Such a metaphysical concep-
tion must be rejected. Social reality is not reducible to a system
of laws. Concepts are simply instruments for apprehending the
world. Understanding remained for Weber, the unique approach of
the policy sciences. Ideal type is an instrument to apprehend the
cultural reality. This concept signifies, in methodological terms,
the freedom from metaphysical prejudices. Thus multiplicity of
ideal-types could be generated, according to the directions of our
interest and the needs of policy formulations.
The sense of imposition of ideal type involves the view of
"social" man as the creator of society which generates a sociology
of policy action (clearly in contrast to the sociology of social
system derived from the problem of order). This method is
analytical-historical. It must provide the analytic task of
history to find a causal explanation. Policy science is then an
empirical science. It must attempt to understand as much as
possible how man evaluates, appraises, creates, and destroys his
various social relationships.
Policy Action as Social Action
Policy actions are social in nature. Weber suggests "action
is social insofar as by virtue of the subjective meaning attached
to it by the acting individual (or individuals). It takes account
of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course"
(Weber, 1947:88). He categorizes social action in four parts:
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(a) zueckrational, (b) wertrational, (c) affectually-oriented
action, (d) traditionally-oriented action.
Zueckrational is the most goal-oriented. It is an orienta-
tion which seeks rationally defined ends. Wertrational is the
value-oriented action. Its orientation is rational but the end is
absolute. Affectually oriented action underscores emotions and
feelings of the actor. Its orientation is affective. Finally,
traditionally oriented action rests its end on "long practice"
borne out by customary practices.
Yet the question remains--how does policy action as social
action seek legitimacy? Weber defines legitimate order as "social
action which is oriented to certain determinate maxims or rules
and their orientation includes the recognition that they are
binding on the actor or the corresponding action constitutes a
desirable model for him to initiate (Weber, 1947:124). In the
final analysis, Weber viewed that major types of authority rela-
tionships (traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational) rested on
the basis of domination. Hence, stability, he stated, inversely
is an outcome of domination. Legitimacy of a system of domination
is the important raison d'etre to the stability of an authority
relationship. "State", he surmised, was a "compulsory political
association" to the extent that it claimed "monopoly" to the legi-
timate use of force in the fulfillment of order. Legitimate
domination exercises power. Power provides a successful claim to
the exercise of authority. It provides maintenance of order,
despite resistance.
No commentary of Weber's view of policy sciences would be
complete without discussion of his conception of comparative policy
sciences. The cornerstone of Weberian analysis is historical. He
viewed history as a process of rationalization. The vast forces of
his extensive comparative scholarship employed causal tour de force
of necessary antecedent social conditions in the examination of
policy questions. Unlike Marx, he viewed the development (evolution)
of cultural production of policy throughout history increasingly
becoming rational. This evolution of historical rationality
suggests the development of an "universal ethic" (Smelser, 1976:115).
It provides the examination of social reality as an outcome of open
ethical considerations. For example, bureaucracy, he surmised, is
an outcome of historical-cultural forces from ascriptive to achieved
society. Social conditions have transformed the forces of traditional
authority to legal-rational authority. This transition is embedded
in the transformation of social conditions.
His chief methodological strategy in the examination of
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social change as mentioned earlier, was "ideal type". He offers a
definition.
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one
or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many
diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally
absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged
according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a
unified analytic construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual
purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically
anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research
faces the task of determining in each individual case, the
extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or
diverges from reality. (Weber, 1949:90, underlining in the
original).
This ideal-type is related to an historical idea. What is then the
significance of such ideal-type constructs to policy science? In
an important way, Weber viewed the explanation of policy sciences
in the historical-analytic reality of cultural configurations. The
"logic" of cultural sciences, helps us to employ this (ideal-type)
methodological strategy in order to interpret historical-causal
"viewpoints". In the final analysis, the proper relevance of any




To summarize--the science of social policy, according to
Weber, implies the following conclusion:
(a) The aim of the social scientist can never be to
eliminate the relative perspective of social reality.
The task is to explain this reality within a cultural
framework.
(b) Any policy is a set of formal judgments--abstractions
from perceptions of reality.
(c) Values do define social "problems".
(d) The science of social policy views social conditions
as "means" and not "ends". Hence, the underlining of
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